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 INTRODUCTION 
 Confabulation describes the emergence of memories of 
events and experiences that never happened (Wernicke, 
 1900 ). Diverse classifi cations have been proposed, usually in 
the form of dichotomies refl ecting variations that the authors 
perceived in their specifi c patient population. From this liter-
ature, at least four different forms emerge (Schnider,  2008 ): 
 (1)  Provoked confabulations in the form of intrusions in 
memory tests (Kopelman,  1987 ; Schnider, von Daniken, 
& Gutbrod,  1996a ). These also occur in healthy subjects 
(Burgess & Shallice,  1996 ). 
 (2)  Momentary confabulations which are false statements 
that patients make up in discussions or upon questioning 
(Berlyne,  1972 ; Bonhoeffer,  1901 ). They are the most 
frequently reported form of confabulation. They do not 
have a strict anatomical basis (Gilboa & Moscovitch, 
 2002 ; Schnider,  2008 ), may occur or disappear during 
the course of a disease, and likely have diverse mecha-
nisms. 
 (3)  Fantastic confabulations which are implausible and defy 
logical thinking. This form is rare and has been described 
in severe dementia, delirium (Damasio, Graff Radford, 
Eslinger, Damasio, & Kassel,  1985 ), and psychosis 
(Kraepelin,  1886 ,  1887 ; presumably also Gundogar & 
Demirci,  2006 ). 
 (4)  Behaviorally spontaneous confabulations in which 
thought and behavior are guided by memories that do 
not pertain to ongoing reality (Schnider et al.,  1996a ; 
Schnider & Ptak,  1999 ). Patients act on the basis of 
memories, which may have correctly guided their be-
havior in the past, such as professional obligations, but 
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which do not pertain to present reality, for example, 
their status of being hospitalized. This disorder is asso-
ciated with severe amnesia and disorientation. While 
etiologies vary, lesions consistently involve the posterior 
medial orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) or structures directly 
connected with it (Schnider,  2003 ,  2008 ). 
 Proposed mechanisms of confabulations range from a de-
sire to fi ll gaps in memory to disorders of high level moni-
toring mechanisms (see review in Schnider,  2008 ). Most 
theories were derived from clinical observation and were 
suggested to account for all types of confabulation. Another 
model was derived from observations in healthy subjects 
(Burgess & Shallice,  1996 ) and then applied to a severe 
confabulator (Burgess & McNeil,  1999 ). However, most 
theories have no empirical basis, that is, they lack an 
experimental procedure that would allow one to test their 
validity in confabulating patients and to explore the physio-
logical underpinnings of the proposed mechanisms. Excep-
tions to this rule are Moscovitch’s “strategic retrieval 
hypothesis,” which applies to diverse forms of confabulation 
(Gilboa, Alain, Stuss, Melo, Miller, & Moscovitch,  2006 ; 
Moscovitch,  1989 ,  1995 ), and Schnider’s “reality fi lter hy-
pothesis”, which specifi cally applies to behaviorally sponta-
neous confabulation (Schnider,  2003 ,  2008 ). These two 
theories have been verifi ed with specifi c experimental para-
digms in groups of confabulating patients. 
 “The strategic retrieval model” elaborated by Moscovitch 
and co-workers (Gilboa et al.,  2006 ; Moscovitch,  1989 ,  1995 ; 
Moscovitch & Melo,  1997 ) conceives of confabulations as an 
impairment of memory retrieval processes. The model distin-
guishes between two forms of retrieval: associative retrieval 
which allows a cue to automatically activate a memory, and 
strategic retrieval which is self-initiated and effortful. At least 
one subcomponent organizes the memory search; another 
subcomponent monitors the output of the memory search and 
verifi es the recovered memory trace. According to this hypo-
thesis, confabulations arise when the subcomponent of moni-
toring is defi cient. Specifi cally, confabulations would be the 
consequence of the conjunction of the activation of a faulty 
memory followed by defi cient monitoring of the recovered 
memory. To test their hypothesis, Moscovitch and co-workers 
presented specifi c cue words to patients and asked them to pro-
vide a personal experience (episodic retrieval) or a historical 
event (semantic retrieval) related to each cue (Moscovitch & 
Melo,  1997 ). Another technique was to have patients recount 
details of fairy tales or bible parts (Gilboa et al.,  2006 ). The 
authors found that patients classifi ed as confabulating amne-
sics produced more confabulations than non-confabulating am-
nesics and controls in fairy tales and bibles stories and in both 
versions of the cue words task (Gilboa et al.,  2006 ; Moscovitch 
& Melo,  1997 ). Whereas at initial presentation, the theory 
appeared to apply particularly to momentary confabulations 
(presence of confabulations in the cue task was also a crite-
rion for classifying patients as confabulators; Moscovitch & 
Melo,  1997 ), the theory was later extended to behaviorally 
spontaneous confabulation (Gilboa et al.,  2006 ). 
 Schnider’s “reality fi lter hypothesis” specifi cally refers to 
behaviorally spontaneous confabulation and disorientation. 
It tries to explain the reality confusion characterizing these 
disorders (Schnider,  2003 ,  2008 ). It is based on the observa-
tion that this form of confabulation is strongly associated 
with an inability to distinguish between memories relating to 
current reality and memories that do not. Specifi cally, when 
performing repeated runs of a continuous recognition task 
composed of the same pictures, the patients failed to realize 
whether they had seen an item in the ongoing run (“current 
reality”) or in a previous run (“past reality”); they had an 
abnormal increase of false positive responses from the sec-
ond run on (Schnider et al.,  1996a ; Schnider & Ptak,  1999 ). 
This failure also very strongly predicted disorientation 
(Schnider, von Daniken, & Gutbrod,  1996b ) and paralleled 
the individual clinical course of the patients (Schnider, Ptak, 
von Daniken, & Remonda,  2000 ). Positron emission tomog-
raphy studies with healthy subjects performing adapted ver-
sions of the same task demonstrated activation of the 
posterior orbitofrontal cortex (area 13) (Schnider, Treyer, & 
Buck,  2000 ) and subcortical loops (Treyer, Buck, & 
Schnider,  2003 ). An evoked potential study indicated that 
the correct judgment of items as not-pertaining-to-now (the 
avoidance of false positive responses) occurs at an early 
stage of processing, at approximately 200–300 ms, before 
processes of (conscious) recognition and re-encoding set in 
(Schnider, Valenza, Morand, & Michel,  2002 ). Based on 
these fi ndings, the reality fi lter hypothesis holds that the re-
ality confusion characterizing behaviorally spontaneous 
confabulation emanates from the failure of a preconscious 
orbitofrontal mechanisms that suppresses the interference of 
memories that do not pertain to ongoing reality (Schnider, 
 2008 ). This result also differentiates our task from exclusion 
paradigms which require conscious processing to retrieve 
contextual information (Jacoby,  1991 ; Mandler,  1980 ). 
 As to the mechanism underlying reality confusion, a re-
cent study showed that behaviorally spontaneous confabula-
tion and disorientation are strongly associated with a failure 
to abandon previously valid anticipations once they are no 
longer valid; the patients had defi cient extinction capacity 
(Nahum, Ptak, Leemann, & Schnider,  2009 ). 
 Thus, the reality fi lter theory specifi cally tries to explain 
the false sense of reality that is manifest in behaviorally spon-
taneous confabulation and disorientation; it proposes that the 
brain uses an ancient biological faculty—extinction—to keep 
thought in phase with reality, and that a failure of extinction 
induces the inability to sense that an upcoming memory 
(thought) does not relate to ongoing reality (Schnider,  2008 ; 
Nahum et al.,  2009 ). However, the theory is not meant to 
explain the propensity of patients to talk about their falsely 
conceived reality, that is, the intensity of the “momentary” 
confabulations. 
 In this study, we describe a patient with non-herpetic limbic 
encephalitis who presented typical, severe and persistent be-
haviorally spontaneous confabulation and disorientation. How-
ever, she did not confabulate in task commonly used to probe 
the presence of momentary (purely verbal) confabulations. The 
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case allowed us to explore the respective role of strategic 
monitoring and reality fi ltering in the generation of behav-
iorally spontaneous confabulation. 
 CASE REPORT 
 A 38-year-old, previously healthy woman was admitted to 
Neurology for insidiously developing amnesia. She had 
started to have diffi culty in recognizing familiar people and 
organizing her work as a lawyer 1 month previously. More 
and more, she forgot appointments, lost fi les, and became 
confused. At admission, there was severe amnesia and dis-
orientation; the patient was very concerned about her bad 
memory. 
 Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) ( Figure 1 ) showed 
an area of abnormal signal in the bilateral medial temporal 
lobes including amygdala and hippocampus, more marked 
on the left side, with extension into the insula, the poste-
rior medial orbitofrontal and ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex, and the caudate nucleus on both sides. Initial cere-
brospinal fl uid (CSF) examination showed a mild lympho-
monocytic pleocytosis (20 leukocytes/ μ L), normal protein 
  
 Fig. 1.  Extension of the infl ammation 6 weeks after start of the encephalitis. Arrowheads indicate regions of abnormal signal. (A) T2-
weighted axial magnetic resonance images (TR 104, TE 4000 ms) showing diffuse infl ammation of the medial orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), 
the anterior medial temporal lobe (MTL), hippocampus, and insula. (B) Coronal and (C) sagittal Flair images (TR 441 ms, TE 6000 ms) 
indicating extended infl ammation of the medial orbitofrontal (gyrus rectus) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex extending into the caudate 
nucleus; the MTL, including amygdala and hippocampus, perirhinal and parahippocampal cortex, and extension in to the insula. 
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and glucose levels, and positive intrathecal IgG synthesis 
with oligoclonal bands. Toxic, metabolic and infectious 
work-up, including cerebrospinal fl uid (CSF) polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR) for Herpes 1 to 6, were negative. Ex-
tensive oncological workup, including abdominal computed 
tomography (CT), pelvic ultrasound, mammography and 
whole body positron emission tomography (PET) -CT, were 
negative. Paraneoplastic and autoimmune auto-antibodies, 
including all hitherto known antibodies associated with 
limbic encephalitis (anti-neuronal, -GAD, -Hu, -Ri, -YO, 
CV2/CRMP, -Amphiphysin, -Ma2, -NMDA, -VGKC, -neuropil; 
laboratories of Prof. A. Vincent, Oxford, and Prof. J. Dalmau, 
Philadelphia), were negative. A brain biopsy revealed 
microglial and lymphocytic infi ltration. A treatment with 
acyclovir for 3 weeks was initiated with no effect. High-
dose intravenous methlyprednisolone and subsequent in-
travenous immunoglobulins appeared to slow, but not to 
halt progression. Despite the absence of a tumor or a 
specifi c autoantibody, the clinical fi ndings, the CSF, the 
brain biopsy, and the MRI were compatible with limbic 
encephalitis (identifi cation of an anti-neuronal antibody 
may help but is not required for the diagnosis; Andersen 
and Barber,  2008 ). 
 The patient was transferred to neurorehabilitation 
2 months after the initial manifestations. The clinical condi-
 tion, as described below, remained stable for approxi-
mately 2 months (2–4 months after the beginning), but 
then slowly worsened with increasing anomia, anxiety, 
and depression. Cerebrospinal fl uid showed normal cell 
count and protein but persistence of oligoclonal bands. 
MRI showed less infl ammation, but generalized brain 
atrophy slowly set in over the next months. All testing 
described in the following was conducted in the fi rst 
2 months in neurorehabilitation, in which the patient’s 
condition was stable. 
 Behavioral Observation 
 Upon admission, the patient was anxious, paced around in 
the unit in search of other people, explored other bedrooms 
in an indefi nable search of something, then indicated that 
she searched for someone from her family or from the of-
fi ce. In the night she was agitated and often left the bed-
room in the conviction that she had to go to the offi ce to 
prepare some work. She also confused people and kissed 
other patients in the belief that she knew them. She cor-
rectly recognized her parents and her husband, although she 
denied being married. She did not remember having a 
1-year-old child but caressed him on visits, although she 
denied recognizing him. 
 It was diffi cult to motivate her for therapies as she was 
convinced that she had to go to work. For approximately 
2 months, professional obligations were the dominant confab-
ulatory theme. She appeared to believe that the unit was part 
of her lawyer’s study and permanently searched for her col-
leagues and for legal fi les. She repeatedly tried to leave the 
hospital so that the unit’s automatic door-locking system had 
to be activated (magnetic wristlet locking the door and eleva-
tors as she approached them). 
 The following interview gives an impression of her false 
ideas about where she was and what her role was. It took 
place in her hospital bedroom 4 weeks after admission to 
neurorehabilitation. 
 The examiner (A.S.), who had followed the patient since 
admission, wore a white coat and was easily recognizable as 
a physician:
 Examiner: “Do you recognize me?” 
 Patient: “I think we have never met. … Well we have 
already met, but we have never worked together”. 
 E: “Do you know why we are here, in this room?” 
 P: “Me? Yes, because I have a client. But we will talk 
about this in the presence of the judge. We have to review the 
status of both of them: what they want, whether they want to 
stay together. This is a proceeding of divorce, but they want 
to stay together.” 
 E: “What have you been doing this morning?” 
 P: “I have seen the son. That is, one of them, because there 
are two.” 
 E: “What will you do this afternoon?” 
 P: “Well, I have fi nished now. I have just seen the son. One 
of them, because there are several.” 
 E: “So, what do have on the program for this afternoon?” 
 P: “I will be there.” 
 E: “To do what?” 
 P: “Respond to the questions.” 
 E: “What place is this? How is it called?” 
 P: “We are in court.” 
 E: “Do you know my profession?” 
 P: “You are a jurist … a lawyer … a judge.” 
 E: “I wear a white coat.” 
 P: “A judge.” 
 E: “You think I am a judge?” 
 The examiner shows his badge which indicates that he is 
professor and chief physician. The patient looks at the badge 
and continues:
 P: “I don’t know. It says ‘chief physician’.” 
 E: “And what does this mean?” 
 P: “That you’re not a judge … Professor? So, it is rather 
the scientifi c side, … that you assure the quality—my 
quality—as a colleague”.  
 Shortly after the interview, the patient was again in the 
hallway searching for her partners. This confabulatory theme 
dominated throughout her stay in neurorehabilitation and 
was only exchanged by two other ideas held for approxi-
mately 2 weeks: One day, in springtime, she was particularly 
anxious because she was convinced that her brother was 
waiting for her to go skiing. For days, she walked up and 
down the unit, obviously distressed by the fact that she could 
not fi nd her brother who was waiting for her. After approxi-
mately 2 weeks, a new idea came up: she desperately 
searched for her badminton partner who was waiting for her 
somewhere in the unit. One week later, this idea was again 
replaced by her conviction that she had professional obliga-
tions as a lawyer in our unit or at court. 
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 Neuropsychological Evaluation 
 Neuropsychological evaluation was performed regularly 
from one month to three months after her admission (2 to 4 
months after the beginning of the disease) when confabula-
tory behavior, disorientation and memory failure were stable. 
Results were stable over time. The study was approved by 
the Ethical Committee of the University Hospital of Geneva. 
 The patient was collaborative and alert during testing. 
Language was fl uent but marked by word-fi nding diffi culties. 
 Table 1 summarizes the results of formal neuropsychological 
testing. There was marked anomia and slight defi cit of seman-
tic memory as evaluated by the Pyramid and Palm Tree Test 
(Howard & Patterson,  1992 ). Comprehension, reading and 
writing were intact. Attentional, arithmetic, visuo-constructive, 
and visuospatial capacities were intact, as well as perception, 
except for defi cient recognition of famous faces (although im-
mediate recognition of anonymous faces was normal). Evalu-
ation of executive functions showed normal interference 
control and fi gural fl uency, whereas verbal fl uency and plan-
ning ability were defi cient. Despite marked anomia and 
memory impairment, intelligence was still in the normal range. 
 There was severe verbal and non-verbal anterograde am-
nesia with impaired learning, absent delayed free recall, and 
uncontrolled recognition with a high false positive rate. Ret-
rograde amnesia, as determined with the Autobiographical 
interview (Kopelman,  1989 ), was also severe and concerned 
all life periods, with preservation of semantic memory for 
early childhood. Responses were non-specifi c, but not con-
fabulatory; the common response was “I don’t know.” 
 Orientation to time, place, and current situation was se-
verely defi cient. She produced confabulations in response to 
questions concerning her current situation (e.g., to the ques-
tion of why she was in the hospital, she answered that she 
was working on a legal case) and in response to questions 
probing autobiographical episodic memory (e.g., to the 
question about what she had done the day before, she an-
swered that she had gone to a school to meet a person for a 
legal case) and future activities (e.g., to the question about 
what she intended to do in the afternoon, she answered that 
she planned to go back to her offi ce to fi nish a report). Con-
fabulations in response to questions regarding semantic per-
sonal information were restricted to her age (she sometimes 
reported that she was 10 years younger) and on one occasion 
to her profession (she said that she was a medical student). 
 Strategic Monitoring 
 Diverse tasks probing strategic monitoring have been pro-
posed (Gilboa et al.,  2006 ), including the analysis of errors 
in detailed recounts of bible stories or fairy tales. In this 
study, we used the following tests: 
 Confabulation Questionnaire 
 According to the strategic retrieval hypothesis, confabulations 
should occur both in episodic and semantic memory, as both 
require strategic retrieval (Moscovitch & Melo,  1997 ). Dalla 
 Table 1.  Neuropsychological results 
 Neuropsychological test  Patient  Percentile 
 Orientation score (von Cramon 
  and Säring,  1982 ) 
 6  Normal 
 score  ≥ 16 
 WAIS-R (Tewes,  1991 ) 
 Verbal IQ  94  34 
 Performance IQ  91  27 
 Total IQ  92  30 
 WMS-R (Wechsler,  1987 ) 
 Attention  96  39 
 Verbal  <50  <1 
 Visual  <50  <1 
 General  <50  <1 
 Delay  <50  <1 
 Autobiographical memory interview 
   (Kopelman, Wilson, & Baddeley,  1989 ) 
 Childhood semantic  12  
 Childhood autobiographic  1  
 Adult semantic  1  
 Adult autobiographic  0  
 Recent semantic  0  
 Recent autobiographic  0  
 Digit span (Wechsler,  1945 )  6  27 
 Corsi block tapping (Milner,  1971 )  5  16 
 California Verbal Learning Test (Delis, 
   Kramer, Kaplan, & Ober,  1987 ) 
 Trial 5  4  <1 
 Sum trials 1–5  10  <1 
 Long delay free recall  0  <1 
 Recognition, correct  10  <1 
 Recognition, false positives  19  <1 
 Pyramids and Palm Trees Test 
   (Howard and Patterson,  1992 ) 
 43  
 Boston Naming Test (Kaplan, 
   Goodglass, & Weintraub,  1983 ) 
 12  <1 
 Word fl uency (Thurstone and Thurstone,  1963 ) 
 Total number of words  8  2 
 Design fl uency (Regard, Strauss, & 
   Knapp,  1982 ) 
 Total number of designs  31  21 
 Stroop test, interference condition 
   (Heaton et al., 1993) 
 Seconds  22  74 
 Errors  1  40 
Barba’s ( 1993 ) Confabulation Questionnaire contains subtests 
with questions concerning personal and general semantic 
memory, episodic memory, orientation for space and time, and 
semantic and episodic memory questions to which the appro-
priate response is “I don’t know.”  Table 2 summarizes the pa-
tient’s performance. She did not confabulate on any “I don’t 
know” or general semantic question. Performance was poor on 
all subtests except semantic and episodic questions to which the 
correct response was “I don’t know” ( Table 2 ). Only four con-
fabulations were evoked: three in response to questions about 
episodic memory (“What did you do yesterday? Who did you 
meet yesterday? When did you go to the restaurant for the last 
time?”) and one in response to a personal semantic question 
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relating to situational orientation (“Why are you in the hospi-
tal?”). Thus, the patient confabulated in response to questions 
regarding her personal status (she was disoriented) but not in 
response to semantic questions; thus, she did not have a general 
“monitoring” failure that would be expected if she had defi cient 
strategic retrieval. 
 Crovitz Cue Word Test 
 The absence of confabulations in the semantic subtests of the 
Confabulation Battery might theoretically be due to low 
strategic demands. We, therefore, applied Moscovitch’s ver-
sion of the Crovitz cue-word test (Crovitz & Schiffman, 
 1974 ; Moscovitch,  1995 ), which poses high and equal de-
mands on strategic retrieval from episodic and semantic 
memory (Moscovitch & Melo,  1997 ). The patient was 
asked to describe details of a specifi c event from her per-
sonal life (episodic memory) or historical events (seman-
tic memory) related to 12 cues words. Cue words for 
personal events were: “angry, break, dog, fi nd, game, 
happy, letter, lonely, make, river, successful, throw”; cue 
words for historical events were: “assassination, battle, 
exploration/explorer, fi re/natural disaster, Indians/settlers, 
invention/scientifi c discovery, miracle, queen/king, revolt/
rebellion, saint, sea/ocean, train.” Responses were scored 
on a 0–3 scale with 3 points for a full detailed description 
including time and location; 2 points for a specifi c event 
with some details but lacking information about place and 
time; 1 point for non-specifi c information about an event; 
0 point if nothing was provided. Two independent raters 
scored the responses and checked for the presence of con-
fabulations.  Table 2 shows that the patient badly performed 
in both the semantic and the episodic part of the test, but 
gave a response to each cue word; most recalled events 
were non-specifi c, except six recalled in detail. Most re-
ported events related to childhood. Most importantly, she 
produced absolutely no confabulation in response to any 
cue-word, indicating that strategic retrieval processes were 
not impaired. 
 Table 2.  Patient’s and normal controls’ performance on the Confabulation Battery and the Crovitz Test 
 Task 
 Patient 
Scores 
 Confabulations 
(number) 
 Controls 
Scores 
 Confabulations 
(number) 
 Confabulation Battery 
  Personal semantic memory  12/20  0  20 ± 0  0 
  Episodic memory  6/15  3  13.95 ± 0.9  0 
  Orientation time-place  1/10  5  10 ± 0  0 
  General semantic memory  4/15  0  13.95 ± 1  0 
  Linguistic semantic memory  5/15  0  13.5 ± 1.2  0 
  I don’t know episodic  10/10  0  10 ± 0  0 
  I don’t know semantic  10/10  0  10 ± 0  0 
 Crovitz Test 
  Episodic  14/24  0  22.8 ± 4  0 
  Semantic  16/24  0  21.6 ± 4  0 
 Note.  Normal control data (from 12 healthy adults subjects) taken from Dalla Barba et al. ( 1997 ). 
 Supplementary Material 
 To view the verbatim description of two personal events 
and four historical events, please access an online-only 
supplementary appendix. Please visit journals.cambridge.
org/INS, then click on the link “Supplementary Material” 
at this article. 
 Reality Filter 
 Memory selection 
 We tested the capacity to select memories pertaining to the 
present with an experimental task used in several previous 
studies (Ptak & Schnider,  1999 ; Schnider et al.,  1996a , 
 1996b ; Schnider, Bonvallat, et al.,  2005 ; Schnider, Ptak, 
et al.,  2000 ; Schnider,  2008 ). This task has two runs of a 
continuous recognition test, composed of the same mean-
ingful pictures (Snodgrass & Vanderwart,  1980 ); the only 
difference between the runs is that pictures are presented in 
different order. Subjects are asked to indicate picture recur-
rences only within the ongoing run. Thus, in the second run, 
they have to disregard familiarity with items from the pre-
vious run. The fi rst run assesses pure information storage, 
which is calculated as: Hits – false positives. The interesting 
part is the second run, which is made 45–60 min later. As all 
pictures have already been presented in the fi rst run, subjects 
sense at least some familiarity with them; thus, the second 
run requires the ability to distinguish between items’ pre-
vious occurrence in the currently ongoing rather than the 
previous fi rst run (Schnider et al.,  1996a , b ). 
 Healthy subjects generally performed very well on this 
task. Indeed, in imaging studies, the task had to be much 
more diffi cult (target items repeated only once to twice rather 
than fi ve times; runs separated by one minute rather than 45–
60 min) to be resented as a challenge by the subjects—as they 
indicated when questioned—and to induce consistent brain 
activation; performance still was virtually perfect (Schnider, 
Treyer, et al.,  2000 ; Schnider et al., 2002 ; Treyer et al.,  2003 ). 
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[We succeeded in signifi cantly lowering performance only 
when we used non-verbalizable geometric forms presented 
in rapid succession with short sequences (“runs”) separated 
only by one intervening stimulus (Schnider, Guggisberg, 
Nahum, Gabriel, & Morand,  2010 ).] 
 Although our task can be formally considered a recollec-
tion task (Mandler,  1980 ), the anatomical specifi city 
(Schnider, Treyer, & Buck,  2000 ; Treyer et al.,  2003 ) and 
the ease with which healthy subjects perform it also distin-
guishes it from other, effortful tasks such as the process-
dissociation procedure (Jacoby,  1991 ) or other source 
monitoring and temporal order tasks (Hirst & Volpe,  1982 ; 
Janowsky, Shimamura, & Squire,  1989 ; Johnson, O’Connor, 
& Cantor,  1997 ; Kopelman, Stanhope, & Kingsley,  1997 ; 
Schnider, Gutbrod, Hess, & Schroth,  1996 ), which may be 
impaired in amnesic patients or patients with prefrontal le-
sions without amnesia. None of these tasks has shown to be 
specifi c for any type of confabulation. 
 Using our task in the version described above, we found 
that, in contrast to healthy subjects and non-confabulating 
amnesics, behaviorally spontaneous confabulators had a 
marked performance drop in the second run due to a steep 
increase of false positives (Schnider et al., 1996a ). We de-
scribed this performance drop as “temporal context confu-
sion” (TCC = FP2/Hits2 – FP1/Hits1), where Hits1,2 is the 
number of correctly recognized picture repetitions (max-
imum, 40), FP1,2 is the number of false positive responses in 
runs 1,2 (max. 80). In our studies, healthy subjects and non-
confabulating patients had TCC < 0.3, while behaviorally 
spontaneous confabulators had TCC  ≥ 0.3 (Schnider et al., 
 1996a ; Schnider, Ptak, et al.,  2000 ; Schnider,  2008 ). TCC 
also very strongly correlated with orientation as measured 
with 20 questions (Schnider et al.,  1996b ). 
 The present patient had a severe storage defi cit already in 
the fi rst run with only 28 hits (of 40) and 16 false positives 
(of 80). Most importantly, performance sharply dropped in 
the second run (13 hits; 19 false positives), yielding a TCC 
of 0.89, indicating that she failed to distinguish between 
memories that pertain to “now” and memories that do not. 
Her performance was somewhat atypical in that most (but 
not all) previous behaviorally spontaneous confabulators 
primarily increased their false positives in the second run, 
rather than showing such a marked decrease of hits (Schnider 
& Ptak,  1999 ; Schnider, Ptak, et al.,  2000 ). However, occa-
sional patients expressed their uncertainty in the second run 
by such striking reluctance to admit familiarity (“no” re-
sponse to any item) that TCC became diffi cult to measure 
(Ptak & Schnider,  1999 ). We have interpreted this behavior 
as a indication of intact self monitoring. 
 Extinction capacity 
 According to imaging and electrophysiological studies using 
adapted versions of the paradigm described in the previous 
paragraph in healthy subjects, the ability to distinguish be-
tween memories that pertain to ongoing reality and mem-
ories that do not depends in particular on activity in OFC area 
13 (Schnider, Treyer, et al.,  2000 ) and subcortical structures 
involving known components of the so-called reward system 
(Treyer et al.,  2003 ). This distinction (fi ltering) process has 
an electrocortical correlate –absence of a specifi c electrocor-
tical map confi guration—at an early stage in the re-activation 
of memories, at 200–300 ms, that is, even before the content 
of an upcoming memory is consciously recognized and again 
encoded (Schnider,  2003 ; Schnider et al.,  2002 ). 
 The mechanism behind this selection or fi ltering process 
has been unclear. We suspected that it depended on extinction 
capacity, the ability to learn that a previously valid anticipa-
tion no longer applies. The present case exemplifi es the basis 
for this hypothesis: the patient completely failed to integrate 
the permanent absence of the events that she had anticipated 
into her thinking (see the interview in the case description): 
Despite living in a hospital environment, she constantly 
anticipated to fi nd colleagues and judges relating to her 
professional habits. This failure to abandon previously valid 
anticipations when they no longer apply corresponds to a def-
icit of extinction. In primates, a specifi c extinction failure was 
documented after lesions of the posterior medial orbitofrontal 
cortex, more specifi cally, area 13 (Butter,  1969 ). Single cell 
recordings revealed neurons in this area that specifi cally fi red 
when an anticipated reward was not delivered (Rosenkilde, 
Bauer, & Fuster,  1981 ), thus signaling the absence of an an-
ticipated outcome. We found that in humans, this area also 
activates when subjects anticipate and process outcomes that 
have no tangible reward value (Schnider, Treyer, et al., 2005 ). 
Electrophysiologically, the non-emergence of anticipated 
outcomes (extinction trials) induced a specifi c electrocortical 
response at an early stage of outcome processing, 200–300 
ms (Schnider, Mohr, Morand, & Michel,  2007 ). 
 Based on these considerations, we recently explored ex-
tinction capacity in patients presenting behaviorally sponta-
neous confabulation and disorientation. We found that both 
disorders are indeed strongly and specifi cally associated 
with a failure of extinction capacity (Nahum et al.,  2009 ). 
The present patient participated in that study, in which we 
applied a simple experimental task of association learning 
and extinction. Participants repeatedly saw the same pair of 
faces on the screen and were asked to predict which one of 
the two faces would have a target stimulus (a spider) on its 
nose. Unbeknownst to the participants, the target stimulus 
was absent after four to six correct choices. The absence of 
the anticipated target (extinction trial) signaled that the tar-
get had switched to the other face. Two measures were cal-
culated: (1) Association learning error rate, that is, the 
unmotivated abandonment of the face that had had the spider 
on the nose in the previous trial; (2) Post-extinction error 
rate, that is, the continued choice of the same face despite 
absence of the spider on its nose in the previous trial (extinc-
tion trial) (detailed description in Nahum et al.,  2009 ). 
 Figure 2 highlights the patient’s performance in compar-
ison with other patients who had either amnesia, a lesion in-
volving the orbitofrontal cortex, or both (OFC lesion with 
amnesia). Similar to the severely disorientated amnesics and 
the other four behaviorally spontaneous confabulators, she 
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easily learned the association (11.6% errors) but had a severe 
extinction failure: after 65% of the extinction trials, she con-
tinued to choose the previously correct face although the last 
(extinction) trial had shown that the target stimulus was no 
longer associated with it. 
 Of note, animal experiments showed that defi cient extinc-
tion capacity is independent of other forms of disinhibition 
as tested, for example, in go/no-go paradigms (Rosenkilde, 
 1979 ). Clinical go/no-go testing in our patient as well as in-
direct measures (executive tasks listed in  Table 1 ) revealed 
no particular perseverative behavior except for her perma-
nent conviction that she had to do work as a lawyer. 
 Clinical course 
 For 4 months in rehabilitation, her state did not markedly 
evolve. She seemed to recognize her parents and her husband 
and took walks with them, which she rapidly forgot. How-
ever, she became more and more depressed and needed anti-
depressant medication. She was apparently aware of her 
memory diffi culties, often cried, and spontaneously com-
plained about the “confusion” in her memory: “Everything is 
mixed up in my head and I forget everything; I don’t know 
what to do.” Despite this insight, she was convinced that the 
personnel on the ward were colleagues of hers and that she 
had to leave the unit to go to court. At the same time, anomia 
worsened. After 4 months in rehabilitation, depression be-
came more and more diffi cult to control, and the patient ex-
pressed suicidal ideas. She was transferred to a psychiatric 
inpatient ward. Mental abilities continued to worsen. After 
1 year, she was profoundly demented and unable to collaborate 
in a controlled manner. While mood improved—she appeared 
amused and happy—language degenerated; she gesticulated 
and gibbered with imagined people, but failed to comprehen-
sively respond to questions. She never recognized her child. 
 DISCUSSION 
 This patient presented all features of behaviorally sponta-
neous confabulation: she confabulated in response to ques-
tions, spontaneously acted according to these confabulations, 
was disoriented with regards to time, place, and her current 
role, and had severe amnesia. Similar to previously described 
behaviorally spontaneous confabulators (Schnider et al., 
 1996a ; Schnider,  2008 ) and patients having disorientation 
(Schnider et al.,  1996b ), she failed to distinguish between 
memories that pertain to ongoing reality and memories that 
do not (Memory selection task). In agreement with her be-
havior, and similar to previously studied patients (Nahum 
et al.,  2009 ), she had a specifi c failure of extinction capacity. 
 While failing in these tasks, which constitute the basis of 
the “reality fi lter hypothesis”, she did not satisfy criteria of a 
failure of strategic retrieval monitoring in tasks proposed to 
test this hypothesis (Moscovitch,  1989 ; Moscovitch & Melo, 
 1997 ): she did not confabulate in response to semantic ques-
tions and did not confabulate in tasks requiring retrieval of 
semantic or remote autobiographical memories. The absence 
of confabulations in such tasks is concordant with our earlier 
observation that behaviorally spontaneous confabulators, as 
defi ned above, had no increased tendency to respond to 
questions about seemingly famous people (“who is princess 
Lolita?”), or plausible but inexistent places (“where is 
Premola?”) or objects (“what is a waterknube?”) (Schnider 
et al.,  1996a ). 
  
 Fig. 2.  Association learning and extinction capacity. The fi gure is similar to  fi gure 2 in Nahum et al. ( 2009 ), except that the present patient’s 
performance is highlighted by the black square with a white X. It shows the correlation of orientation with association learning error rate 
(A) and post-extinction error rate (B). Behaviorally spontaneous confabulators had signifi cantly worse post-extinction rate than the other 
patients. Symbols have the following meaning: Black symbols, behaviorally spontaneous confabulators; gray symbols, non-confabulating 
amnesics; empty symbols, non-amnesic subjects; squares, subjects with radiologically proven damage of orbitofrontal cortex; round 
symbols, subjects with no radiologically proven orbitofrontal damage. The regression line refers to the analysis including all subjects. 
Figure adapted from Nahum et al. ( 2009 ) with permission from Elsevier Publishers. 
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 A defi cit of strategic monitoring during memory retrieval 
was initially demonstrated in patients with momentary con-
fabulations using methods that we also applied in the current 
study (Moscovitch & Melo,  1997 ). More recently, the strate-
gic retrieval account was also suggested to explain sponta-
neous confabulations, including the form observed in the 
present patient (Gilboa et al.,  2006 ), although patient 
classifi cation appeared to have been somewhat problematic 
(see discussion in Schnider,  2008 , p. 252f.). In that study, 
patients were asked to retrieve bible stories and fairy tales, 
that is, semantic memories. When recalling the stories, the 
confabulating patients made more confabulations, which re-
lated both to time and content, thus satisfying a basic re-
quirement of the theory. 
 Why, then, did our patient not produce confabulations in 
tasks of strategic monitoring? One interpretation would be 
that she had too defi cient autobiographical and semantic 
memory to use it as a basis for confabulations; thus, strategic 
monitoring was not necessary. This interpretation neglects 
that she did produce responses to most questions. Importantly, 
however, this interpretation would also support the conclusion 
that our patient’s reality confusion was indeed not due to de-
fective strategic monitoring as measured by the tasks proposed 
to test it: if reality confusion can occur in the absence of auto-
biographical and semantic memories susceptible to be confab-
ulated on, then the failure to monitor these non-existent 
memories can obviously not explain the reality confusion. 
 Another reason for the discrepancy between our results 
and that of Gilboa et al. ( 2006 ) might be different defi nitions 
of “spontaneous confabulations”. The term was introduced 
by Pick ( 1905 ) to describe spontaneously produced confab-
ulations, in contrast to confabulations provoked by sugges-
tive questioning. Pick did not suggest different mechanisms. 
Kopelman ( 1987 ) revived this dichotomy and described pro-
voked confabulations as those occurring in response to ques-
tions and in tests of memory; he considered them a normal 
response to a faulty memory. Spontaneous confabulations, in 
contrast, were considered a different, abnormal kind of con-
fabulations characterized as sustained, wide-ranging, and 
fantastic. We made an even stronger distinction: we defi ned 
provoked confabulations as those appearing in memory tests 
and quantifi ed them as the number of intrusions (Schnider 
et al.,  1996a ). By contrast, we used the term spontaneous 
confabulation in a strict sense, demanding that the confabu-
latory behavior was truly spontaneous. Our criterion for the 
spontaneity was that patients at least occasionally acted ac-
cording to their false ideas (Schnider et al.,  1996a ; Schnider, 
Ptak, et al.,  2000 ; Schnider & Ptak,  1999 ). We now propose 
the term “behaviorally spontaneous confabulation” for this 
form of confabulation, which is probably always associated 
with disorientation and amnesia (Schnider,  2008 ) and indeed 
corresponds to the original version of Korsakoff’s syndrome 
(Bonhoeffer,  1904 ). Thus, the discrepancy between our pre-
sent fi ndings and the interpretation of Gilboa et al. ( 2006 ) may 
result from a different defi nition of “spontaneous confabula-
tions.” Although the studies testing the strategic monitoring 
hypothesis included patients with undeniable reality confusion 
in the sense of behaviorally spontaneous confabulation (Gil-
boa et al.,  2006 ; Moscovitch,  1989 ,  1995 ; Moscovitch & 
Melo,  1997 ), we suspect that the theory will prove to be par-
ticularly helpful for understanding the verbal behavior of the 
patients—the momentary confabulations. The reality fi lter hy-
pothesis, in contrast, is thought to explain the reality confu-
sion in thinking and thus specifi cally applies to behaviorally 
spontaneous confabulations and disorientation, while it is 
not predictive regarding the intensity of the verbal expres-
sion of the reality confusion. 
 This interpretation also suggests that the production of 
confabulations, as they emerge in discussions, depends on 
the interplay between at least two processing stages: 
 (1)  The generation of false memories. Candidate mecha-
nisms for the emergence of false memories are defi cits in 
the evocation and construction of memories (Mosco-
vitch,  1989 ,  1995 ; Schacter, Norman, & Koutstaal,  1998 ), 
defi cient source monitoring (Johnson & Raye,  1998 ), 
false temporality in thinking (Dalla Barba, Cappelletti, 
Signorini, & Denes,  1997 ; Dalla Barba,  2002 ), defi cient 
reality fi ltering (Schnider,  2008 ), and others. 
 (2)  The verbal expression of false memories. Possible fac-
tors infl uencing patients’ inclination to accept and com-
municate their false memories encompass defi cient 
self-control (Benson et al.,  1996 ) or strategic monitoring 
(Gilboa et al.,  2006 ; Moscovitch,  1989 ,  1995 ; Mosco-
vitch & Melo,  1997 ), executive dysfunction (Metcalf, 
Langdon, & Coltheart,  2007 ), a tendency to fi ll gaps in 
memory (Pick,  1905 ), motivational factors (Conway & 
Tacci,  1996 ; Flament,  1957 ; Fotopoulou, Conway, Tyrer, 
Birchall, Griffi ths, & Solms,  2008 ), personality traits 
(Williams & Rupp,  1938 ), and others. 
 In this schema, defi cient reality fi ltering as explored in our 
studies (Schnider,  2008 ) explains only the reality confusion 
characteristic of behaviorally spontaneous confabulators 
and disorientation: a failure of the area-13-dependent, pre-
conscious fi lter mechanism prevents the patients from 
sensing whether upcoming memories (thoughts) relate to 
ongoing reality or not. Whether they talk about their false 
ideas spontaneously or only in response to questions, may 
depend on other factors, for example personality traits 
(Williams & Rupp,  1938 ) or motivational factors (Fotopoulou 
et al.,  2008 ). This tendency possibly also depends on the 
type of brain damage and the lesion site; in patients with 
OFC destruction following rupture of an anterior communi-
cating artery aneurysm, it may depend on defi cient strategic 
monitoring (Gilboa et al.,  2006 ). 
 In summary, the present case is consistent with previous 
studies indicating that behaviorally spontaneous confabula-
tion is associated with a failure to distinguish between mem-
ories that pertain to ongoing reality and memories that do 
not. It also supports the idea that this failure results from 
defi cient extinction capacity. At the same time, it shows that 
intense behaviorally spontaneous confabulation and disori-
entation need not be associated with failure in tasks pro-
posed to test strategic monitoring. 
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 Of note, the conclusions from this study were only possible 
because both the strategic monitoring hypothesis and the re-
ality fi ltering theory have specifi ed experimental tasks associ-
ated with them. These tasks may be imperfect. Thus, the 
known strategic monitoring tasks cover only limited compo-
nents of the theory. Conversely, the memory selection task 
testing the reality fi lter has shown its sensitivity and specifi city 
for behaviorally spontaneous confabulation and disorientation 
only among patients with signifi cant anterograde amnesia as 
determined with delayed free recall. In addition, performance 
is sensitive to strategies that some patients adopt in the face of 
the diffi culty they sense in the second run of the task; occa-
sional false positives (Gilboa et al.,  2006 ) and false negatives 
(Ptak & Schnider,  1999 ) have been reported. Finally, the ex-
tinction task used in this and our previous study (Nahum et al., 
 2009 ) requires explicit, conscious decisions. It is, therefore, 
unlikely to be a perfect measure of the pre-conscious process 
that reality fi ltering seems to be (Schnider et al.,  2002 ). None-
theless, the construction of tasks attempting to test theories of 
confabulation is crucial for future progress. Modern imaging 
and electrophysiological methods then offer the opportunity 
to compare mechanisms underlying different tasks refl ective 
of reality fi ltering, source monitoring, strategic monitoring, or 
recollection depending on exclusion of other qualities than a 
memory’s relation with ongoing reality. In any case, only the-
ories verifi ed with defi ned experimental procedures in prop-
erly controlled groups can be considered more than 
speculations and may offer the potential to explore physiolog-
ical mechanisms underlying the generation of true and false 
memories. 
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